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Abstract. Since the last decades, Southern and Eastern Mediterranean Countries (SEMCs) are following a 
process of progressive trade liberalization. As a consequence of such process, the significance and interest 
on Non-Tariff Measures (NTMs) has increased. The aim of this paper is to discuss the underlying factors 
affecting the implementation of NTMs. NTMs include specific food safety concerns. However, there could 
also be economic and political reasons affecting the frequency of implementation of food safety measures 
(border alerts). We thus explore the significance of two hypotheses that provide an explanation of NTMs in 
Mediterranean countries. The first one is the “reputation effect” or the influence of past history of 
notifications on border rejections. The second one refers to the policy substitution hypothesis or the trade-off 
between NTMs and tariffs. These two approaches intend to give an overview of the implementation of NTMs 
situation across Mediterranean trade food area. Both suggest that there are economic and political factors 
affecting NTM implementation. 
Keywords. Non-tariff measures – Southern and Eastern Mediterranean countries – Trade protection – 
Agro-food trade. 
Commerce alimentaire et mesures non tarifaires dans la Méditerranée 
Résumé. Depuis les dernières décennies, les pays du Sud et de l'Est de la Méditerranée suivent un 
processus de libéralisation progressive des échanges. Comme conséquence de ce processus, l'importance 
et l'intérêt des mesures non tarifaires a augmenté. Le but de cet article est de considérer les facteurs sous-
jacents pour l'application des mesures non tarifaires au-delà des préoccupations spécifiques en matière de 
sécurité alimentaire. Pour ce faire, nous examinons l'importance de deux hypothèses qui fournissent une 
explication aux MNT dans les pays méditerranéens. La première est l'«effet de réputation» ou l'influence du 
passé historique des notifications sur les refus à la frontière. La deuxième fait référence à l'hypothèse de la 
politique de substitution ou compromis entre les mesures non tarifaires et les tarifs douaniers. Ces deux 
points de vue visent à donner une image de la mise en œuvre et la situation des MNT dans le commerce 
alimentaire méditerrannéen. Les deux hypothèses suggèrent qu'il existe des facteurs économiques et 
politiques qui affectent la mise en œuvre des MNT. 
Mots-clés. Mesures non tarifaires – Pays du Sud et de l'Est de la Méditerranée – Protection des échanges 
– Commerce agro-alimentaire. 
 
 
I – Introduction 
Tariffs on imports have been reduced to relatively low levels in the EU and Southern and Easter 
Mediterranean Countries (SEMCs) especially as the result of the periodic rounds of multilateral 
and bilateral trade negotiations. This process has led to an increasing interest in the extent to 
which existing Non-Tariff Measures (NTMs)
1
 may distort or restrict international trade. On one 
side, regulations are often necessary to alleviate market failures, but on the other side, domestic 
                                                             
1
Bradford (2005) defines non-tariff barriers as political or governmental practices, in addition to tariffs, which 
increase the domestic price of a well above their import price. In this paper, we use the more general term 
"Non-Tariff Measures" because these measures could be welfare improving when they provide information 
to consumers and decrease the impact of asymmetric information problem (Bureau et al., 2001; Movchan, 
1999, Disdier et al., 2008). 
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regulations may be imposed simply to restrict imports from foreign competitors (Beghin, 2008). 
In order to address the issues involving the impact of NTMs, accurate and reliable studies on 
the actual reasons that explain NTMs are needed.
2
 
What explains NTMs? There are, of course, health and technical justifications. NTMs are 
employed for many purposes, including the correction of information asymmetries and market 
failures very frequently related to food safety concerns. The use of NTMs is endorsed by the 
implementation of the WTO Agreements on Sanitary and Phitosanitary Measures (SPS) and 
Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT), which provide an international legal framework to regulate 
the implementation of NTMs. When countries implement such measures, they are protecting 
values such as public health, animal or vegetal health, or consumers’ rights. However, they may 
also have potential protectionism purposes. While tariff barriers have been alleviated under 
multilateral liberalization agreements, NTMs have become a common trade restriction. NTMs 
can be used as disguised protection aiming at restricting the entrance of foreign produce 
(Hoeckman and Nicita, 2008; Nimenya et al., 2012).  
Harmonization of NTMs in the Euro-Mediterranean regions is a basic goal of the deep and 
comprehensive free trade area (DCFTA) launched by the EU and most SEMCs. The process, 
agreed in 1995 in Barcelona, and its follow-up, the Union for the Mediterranean (2008) has 
aimed at creating an area of shared prosperity, which is translated in the economic field by the 
establishment of a free trade area between the EU and its Mediterranean partners. Particularly, 
the agro-food trade has followed a gradual liberalization process over the last decades, as 
subsequent revisions of the Association Agreements have eliminated or reduced the trade 
barriers in a preferential and reciprocal basis. Nowadays, the most of agro-food products from 
SEMCs enter at the EU in a duty-free basis, but NTMs still appear as significant obstacles and 
their removal or harmonization involve a pre-condition for a deep integration process.  
To date, the EU has largely dominated the agricultural trade relations of SEMCs. Morocco 
shows a positive agricultural trade balance with the EU but other SEMCs, in particular Algeria 
and Egypt, show a large deficit vis-à-vis the EU (Tudela et al., 2014). According to EU data 
(European Commission, 2013), trade between the EU and the SEMCs in agricultural and 
fishery products shares about 5.5% of total EU imports and about 7.6% of total EU exports 
nowadays. With respect to the products traded, Petit (2009) explains that EU exports to SEMCs 
are much more diversified than the reverse trade flows from SEMC to the EU. In fact, SEMCs 
exports are concentrated on fruits and vegetables, with slight and continuous yearly increases. 
In these goods, SEMCs exploit their competitive advantage, as well as the traditional trade 
linkages, the aforementioned trade preferences and the geographical proximity to EU markets. 
On the other hand, in agricultural goods the EU main exporting section is some processed 
goods such as beverages or prepared foodstuffs. Other relevant agricultural products exported 
from the EU to SEMCs are dairy products and cereals, mostly wheat that helps to balance the 
low food self-suffiency ratio suffered in many SEMCs.  
In parallel and partially linked to the bilateral EU-SEMC agreements, some SEMCs are involved 
in a multilateral South-South integration. This process, namely the Agadir Agreement, has 
incorporated since 2007 Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt and Jordan in a gradual trade liberalization 
process. To date, its impact seems to be minor in agro-food trade. 
Together with the Association Agreements between the EU and SEMCs, the institutional 
framework devised in the Euro-Mediterranean partnership has included financial instruments to 
foster the development of SEMCs. The process is supported by the Support to the European 
Neighbourhood Programme for Agriculture and Rural Development (ENPARD)
3
, which is a 
                                                             
2
 Detailed descriptions on NTMs and their quantification can be found in Deardoff and Stern (1999), Bora et 
al. (2002), and Ferrantino (2006). 
3
In April 2014 CIHEAM launched a web site providing information regarding the ENPARD on SEMCs. The 
website presents various activities developed in the Southern Mediterranean countries which are partners of 
EU through the South ENPARD programme. See http://www.enpard.iamm.fr/en/ 
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policy initiative that is part of the EU's commitment to inclusive growth and stability in its 
neighbourhood, recognising the importance of agriculture in terms of food security, sustainable 
production and rural employment. Among the axis of action in ENPARD, emphasis is put on 
achieving food security objectives, and, simultaneously, contributing to increasing food safety 
and raising quality standards to better benefit from export markets. Then, it is expected that in 
the next years these programs contribute to a further strengthening in the value chains of key 
exports from SEMCs to the EU. Such strengthening would imply a better ability of countries 
involved to comply with public and private standards on imported products. 
Most of the literature dealing with NTMs in the Mediterranean region focuses on the role of 
NTMs on exports from SEMCs to the EU. Emlinger (2010) analysed the implications of NTMs in 
the entry of fruits and vegetables from different sources into the European markets. Cieslik and 
Hagemejer (2009) found that even though the new EU Association Agreements liberalised 
imports of EU products from SEMCs, they did not contribute to the expansion of their exports to 
the EU markets. This happens as SEMC export success not only depends on a greater access 
to EU markets, but also on production adaptation to the EU standards, oriented to enhance 
quality systems and good agricultural practices (González Mellado et al., 2010; Rau and 
Kavallari, 2013).  
With this background, this paper presents the results of the recent research carried out at the 
Universitat Politècnica de València to analyze the underlying factors that affect the use of NTMs 
applied on agricultural and food trade. We focus on two hypothesis, which are: (i) whether the 
implementation of NTMs by the EU is motivated by a systematic behaviour, guided by economic 
and political considerations beyond the appearance of specific food alerts and safety concerns; 
and (ii) whether the implementation of NTMs in SEMCs is related to the removal of tariffs to 
trade, so a substitution of policies could take place. In summary, we are interested in dealing 
with an explanation of the NTM implementation that is not directly or solely linked to food safety 
issues. 
To do so, in the next section, we will explore the EU behaviour expressed by the agro-food 
notifications on food alerts by the EU on imports with Mediterranean origin. Afterwards, the links 
between tariffs and non-tariff measures will be investigated by looking at the possible trade-off 
between tariff and non-tariff protection. The last section summarizes the main findings and 
offers some policy conclusions. 
II – Explaining EU food alerts 
As mentioned above, the EU is a major agro-food trade partner for SEMCs. Accomplishing the 
EU sanitary and safety standards is a challenge for Mediterranean exporters (García Álvarez-
Coque et al., 2012). A way of dealing with this issue is to monitor border rejections, since they 
are indicators of exporting countries to comply with food safety and quality requirements 
imposed by importing countries. During the period 2003 – 2008, the European Rapid Alert 
System for Food and Feed (RASFF) reported a total of 1,123 border rejection notifications 
concerning fruits and vegetables imported from the SEMCsto the EU (Grazia et al., 2009).  
RASFF supplies information on food alerts and border rejections. This database provides a 
direct measure of NTMs, expressed by the number of notifications of SPS measures applied by 
EU countries on imports from its trade partners. RASFF does not provide information of food 
alerts expressed in terms of notifications in given trade chapters of the Harmonized System 
(HS)
4
, which could facilitate their analysis. To solve that, we designed an Excel lexicographic 
tool to facilitate the conversion of over 1792 observations from the RASFF dataset into 
notifications classified by HS code.  
                                                             
4
Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding Systems, used to describe products in trade statistics at 
6-digit, 4-digit and 2-digit levels. 
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Focusing on notifications from the main EU importers concerning SEMCs as origin countries, 
Fig. 1 shows the number of notifications applied by EU authorities on exports from Turkey, 
Morocco and others SEMCs with destination to Spain, Netherlands, France, UK and Germany, 
between 2000 and 2013. Figure 2 reflects the notifications of the considered dataset classified 




Fig. 1. Number of notifications applied by selected EU Member States
a
 on agrofood SEMC
b 
 
exports (a: Spain, Netherlands, France, UK and Germany, b: Morocco, Tunisia, Turkey, 
 Egypt, Lebanon, Algeria and Jordan). Source: Authors’ calculations from RASFF database. 
 
The number of food alerts in the EU has increased in recent years. The observed increase can 
probably be attributed to the rise in notifications for products found to be unfit for consumption, 
but also, due to the increased control related to regulations and standards imposing reinforced 
checks for a list of products from outside the EU. Turkey is one of the countries –overall in the 
world, not only in the SEMC group- with highest number of notifications, which is highlighted in 
every RASFF annual report (see, for example, RASFF 2012). When border rejections are 
measured as a frequency, expressed in rejections per 1000 imported tons, Grazia et al. (2009) 
report an average rejection rate of 0.0493 rejections per 1000 tons of imported fruit and 
vegetables from the Mediterranean region, with Turkey having a frequency rate of 0.0975/1000 
tons.    
Figure 2 shows those trade chapters that accumulate more notifications. The significant number 
of notifications in the product category "Fruits and nuts" (HS 08) is mainly due to the 
notifications on aflatoxins in dried figs from Turkey. The 111 notifications in the category "Tea 
and spices" relate to different spices such as: chilli powder, paprika, curry powder and camomile 
tea, etc. Concretely 89 notifications concern spices and herbs originating from Turkey and 15 
from Egypt. Table 1 summarises the main problems appeared on EU imports from selected 
SEMCs. 
Fish and crustaceans (HS03) is the most-notified category of food of animal origin. In this case, 
the results show clearly that heavy metals and bad hygienic state are still the most reported 
hazards.  
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Fig. 2. Notifications at different trade chapters, by selected EU Member States
a
 on agrofood 
SEMC
b 
exports a: Spain, Netherlands, France, UK and Germany, b: Morocco, Tunisia, 
Turkey, Egypt, Lebanon, Algeria and Jordan) Source: Authors’ calculations from RASFF 
database. 
 
Table 1. Main hazard type, origin and product category (2012). Notifications by selected EU Member 
 States
a
 on agrofood SEMC
b
 exports. Source: Authors calculations based on RASFF 
Origin Main risks Main products 
Egypt Aflatoxins 
Methomyl 
Groundnuts and peanuts 
Fresh strawberries 
Morocco Too high content of sulphite and 
Heavy metals 
Bad hygienic state and parasitic 
infestation 
Fresh and frozen fish  
Tunisia Mycotoxins 
Aflatoxin 
Pistachios and hazelnuts 
Dried Figs. 




Dried figs and hazelnut 
Green peppers 
Lebanon Aflatoxins Pistachios and nuts 
a: Spain, Netherlands, France, UK and Germany; b: Morocco, Tunisia, Turkey, Egypt, Lebanon, Algeria and 
Jordan. 
 
Figure 3 shows the different types of classifications based on RASFF. Since 2008, RASFF 
differentiates between "market notifications" (alerts and information) "border rejections" and 
"news information" (notifications for attention and for follow-up). Market notifications are about 
products found on the Community territory for which a health risk was reported, 1919 in total for 
the countries and period covered. Products that are subject of a border rejection never entered 
the Community and were sent back to the country of origin, destroyed or sento to another 
destination, accounting to 712 cases. 
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exports (a: Spain, Netherlands, France, UK and Germany, b: Morocco, 
Tunisia, Turkey, Egypt, Lebanon, Algeria and Jordan). Source: Authors’ calculations from 
RASFF database. 
Impacts of NTMs largely depend on the type of standard required and policies designed by EU 
with their partners (Disdier et al., 2008; Anders and Caswell, 2009; Disdier and Maret, 2010; 
Martí-Selva and García Álvarez-Coque, 2007). The literature shows that NTMs have basically 
two contradictory sets of effects for developing countries. Essaji (2008) found that the NTMs 
lead to increasing production and compliance costs. By contrast, Maertens and Swinnen (2009) 
suggested that foreign standards push up the production quality and help firms to realize 
beneficial productivity gains. In the same line, Chemnitz et al. (2007), state that SPS and TBT 
measures can bring significant social benefits even to low income countries, such as reduced 
agrochemical use and a framework that guides good agricultural and management practices. 
The EU is an attractive destination for emerging countries exporters, given its relevant agro-
food demand size, the historical relations of trade and the geographical proximity in the case of 
Mediterranean partners. Despite the harmful effect of NTMs, they may aid to improve the quality 
level representing strong motivation to develop trade flows of agro-food products through 
countries.  
Taghouti and Garcia Álvarez-Coque (2013) provided a test for the hypothesis that one product’s 
border rejections in one year may affect the probability of future rejections, and that such effects 
may appear at product, sector and country level. Thus, the quoted authors tested to which level 
that past history of food alerts or notifications, that is to say "reputation", significantly influences 
EU behaviour on actual notifications
5
. At each year (t), the EU authorities may implement NTMs 
based on present risk assessment criteria, but they are also influenced by the past. Hence, the 
hypothesis that the product notifications of the year (t-1) and previous years could raise the 
notifications of the year (t) was examined. 
Taghouti and Garcia Álvarez-Coque (2013)
6
 applied a conditional fixed-effects negative 
binomial regression to determine the effects of certain variables in the number of notifications in 
the year (t). Among the explanatory variables, the “reputation effects” refer to notifications 
issued at (t-1) on the same product (4-digit HS code), on the sector where such product belongs 
to (similar products of the corresponding 2-digit HS code), to the country of origin, and to the 
corresponding geographic area (e.g. Mediterranean region, South America). Other explanatory 
variables influencing current notifications are the per capita GDP of the originating country, and 
the import volume and growth.  
                                                             
5
By doing that, Taghouti and García Álvarez-Coque introduce the reputation effects in the analysis of EU 
agricultural imports, which is comparable to the studies carried out in the USA by Jouanjean et al., 2012. 
6
See also Taghouti (2013) 
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The per capita GDP was taken as a measure of economic development and capacity of the 
exporting country to face NTMs. The level of development of partner countries is expected to be 
negatively correlated with border rejection figures. Indeed, in the quoted study, the per capita 
GDP was statiscally significant at 1% significance level which means that the EU rejections 
depend on variables correlated by the per capita GDP of the countries (infrastructure, human 
capital, etc). Import growth was also found a relevant determinant of the total number of 
refusals, as EU behaviour could be affected in agri-food trade by a protectionist behaviour. 
Indeed, the positive coefficient of this variable means that, as a general trend, a sharp import 
flow increase from a given exporter with a history of non compliance is accompanied by a 
stricter control in the borders so more rejections and notifications by the EU authorities could be 
expected. The impact of the sector and country reputation were also found to be statistically 
significant.  
The variable representing the reputation effect of countries belonging to the Mediterranean 
region was statistically significant but came with a negative sign. In the case of SEMCs, given 
their export specialization in products competing with Southern European production (fruit and 
vegetables and olive oil), the historical partnership and the geographical proximity in the case of 
SEMC might have a positive effect on the compliance to the required standards.  
Linking these results with the figures depicted earlier, there is no evidence that the EU shows a 
specific protectionist behaviour against products from the Mediterranean region, compared to 
products from other regions. Moreover, it is true noting that significant EU investments in the 
agro-exporting sectors in these countries help to overcome NTMs. Such relation can improve 
the capacity of these countries to achieve the quality and standards required by the EU, as the 
financial tools like ENPARD can do as well.  
III – Non-Tariff Measures applied in Southern and Eastern 
Mediterranean countries 
1. The hypothesis of policy substitution 
As a part of their integration process, SEMCs are in different stages of harmonization of their 
NTMs (González-Mellado et al., 2010). Providing knowledge on NTM harmonization in the 
Mediterranean area may be helpful to foster trade rather than restricting it. Tudela et al. (2013, 
2014) used the estimates of ad valorem equivalents of NTMs (AVEs) by Kee et al. (2009) to 
identify "peak levels" in several SEMCs. The AVEs reflect what would be the theoretical tariff 
levels that would produce equivalent effects to the NTMs applied by a given country on a given 
product. It was found that most SEMCs have AVEs that can be considered as "peaks"
7
. It 
appears that stringency of applying measures by the own SEMCs seems to be relatively 
stronger at the borders as compared to a less effective monitoring in the domestic market (De 
Wulf et al., 2009).  
Some authors have suggested the hypothesis of "policy substitution" between tariffs and NTMs. 
The policy substitution hypothesis in the context of large-country terms-of-trade motives for 
tariffs and regulations has been studied in Staiger and Sykes (2009). Going deeper into the 
subject, results by Gourdon et al. (2012) suggest the presence of correlation between the use of 
NTMs and traditional forms of trade policy. In fact, the possibility emerges that tariff and NTMs 
can act as substitute or complementary, in both cases showing the impact to domestic political 
economic pressures (Bown and Tovar, 2011). The evidence is not conclusive as the 
restrictiveness of NTMs can be seen as depending on the sector or the country income (Dean 
et al., 2009). 
                                                             
7
This paper kept the "usual" criteria for identifying peaks: literature identifies as tariff peaks those above 
20% (mentioned in ICSTD, 2009). 
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In order to explore possible interdependence between NTMs and tariffs in agro-food trade we 
studied NTMs situation in a subset of SEMCs gathering the available data for comparing tariffs 
and NTMs equivalents. The products include the whole range of agro-food products at the 6-
digit level of the Harmonized System (HS chapters 01 to 22). 
The NTMs are collected from the data on AVE of Non-Tariff Measures (labelled from now on as 
Non-Tariff Equivalents NTEs) estimated by Kee et al. (2009). NTEs are expressed as 
percentage of the value of the product, which make them directly comparable with tariffs. The 
countries selected are those in the Agadir Agreement, due to their relevant level of integration 
across SEMCs. 
The tariffs data are collected from the World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS) database. 
Concretely for the study, the Most Favoured Nation (MFN) applied tariffs at HS 6-digit were 
collected, corresponding to the same period when the NTE were available. 
Obviously, these estimates are not free of limitations
8
. We are also aware that the tariffs 
selected in WITS database are multilateral, so they only reflect the general trade policy of a 
country and not the expression of the bilateral trade policy with specific partners. 
2. Is trade protection significant? 
We first explore the overall scope of agricultural protection. Descriptive statistics on the 
incidence of tariffs and NTMs in terms of frequency, mean, standard deviation and ratio 
NTE/tariffs were calculated, in order to get a general overview. Table 2 depicts the simple 
average NTEs and tariff levels on agricultural imports. The table shows the relatively high 
protection level in the set of countries studied
9
, with the exception of Jordan. The situation 
changes from one HS chapter to another, as indicated by the relatively high standard deviations 
calculated, with some chapters with low protection -in particular fish- and some others with 
relatively high protection. Across countries, Egypt shows the highest level of standard deviation 
due to almost prohibitive tariffs in HS chapters 21 and 22. Tariffs and NTE figures displayed in 
Table 2 are "multilateral", showing the general orientation of trade policy (total agricultural 
imports of the selected set of countries). Figures don’t correspond to the bilateral trade 
liberalization undertaken among countries in the region or with respect the EU. 
 
Table 2. Non-Tariff Equivalents and Tariffs on agricultural imports
a
 in Agadir countries (ad valorem 
 %). Source: Authors’ calculations 
 Tunisia Morocco Jordan Egypt 
NTEs 
Mean 41.1 35.9 6.4 44.2 
Standard deviation 55.2 53.5 25.0 56.2 
Tariffs 
Mean 73.5 52.9 21.9 66.6 
Standard deviation 53.2 45.9 24.2 376.0 
Ratio NTE/Tariff 0,56 0.68 0.29 0.66 
Note: Calculations carried out including HS Chapters 1 to 22. 
                                                             
8
Kee at al. (2009) offer a comprehensive set of NTEs. Other estimates with a different or more limited scope 
can be found in Deardoff and Stern (1999), Dean et al. (2003) and Vaughan (2005). Nimenya et al. (2010) 
extended the price comparison method to account for imperfect substitution and factor endowment under 
monopolistic competition. Sanjuán et al. (2013) suggest an alternative way of measuring NTE based on the 
gravity equation. 
9
Although the list of countries can be extended to more SEMC, care was taken for incomplete datasets or 
inconsistent figures, so the sample of countries is limited in this paper. 
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3. Are trade policies transparent? 
 
In average, NTEs are lower than tariff levels in the four countries considered, although ratios of 
NTEs to multilateral tariffs range from 0.29 in Jordan to 0.68 in Morocco and Algeria. This 
indicates that although tariff liberalization remains an issue in agricultural trade, non-tariff 
protection is also relevant, in particular because NTMs are not as transparent as tariff 
protection. The fact that the ratios NTE/tariffs are lower in some countries than others suggests 
that transparency of trade policies is not uniform in SEMCs. In the next paragraphs we explore 
protection and transparency in trade rules, showing that both concepts may not necessarily 
overlap. 
The comprehensive set of data regarding protection extracted from the sources quoted in 
Section 3.1 can be classified with the aim of creating a systematic or "taxonomy" of the 
protection. The frequency of the so-called "peak" equivalents was measured, to highlight both 
tariff and NTEs exceeding a certain threshold. To define such peaks, the starting point was the 
modalities document prepared by the Committee of Agricultural Negotiations circulated in the 
Doha current negotiations (WTO, 2008). For developing countries, it suggests that the highest 
tariffs reductions shall be done in those products where the bound tariff or ad valorem 
equivalent is greater than 75 per cent. Besides, when the tariff values are between 0 and 30 per 
cent, the lowest rates of reduction shall be applied. After that, two alternative thresholds for 
tariffs peaks were established at 30% and 75%. On the same token, we identified as NTE peaks 
those values greater than 75%, with the aim of identifying cases where the price effects of 
NTMs were of utmost magnitude. 
Thus, for each country, the taxonomy of products according to their trade protection pattern was 
developed combining the NTE and the tariff level. This allows comparing protection across 
countries and groups of products. To do so, four categories have been defined: 
 (i) High protection: The first category contains all products where tariffs are relatively high 
(above 30 or 75 per cent) and also high NTM are applied (NTEs greater than 75 per cent). 
 (ii) Disguised protection: The second category contains all products where tariffs are 
relatively low (less than 30 or 75 per cent) but high NTM are applied (NTEs greater than 75 per 
cent). 
 (iii) Low protection: The third category contains all products where tariffs are relatively low 
(less than 30 or 75 per cent) and also low NTM are applied (NTEs below 75 per cent). 
 (iv) Transparent protection: The fourth category contains all products where tariffs are 
relatively high (above 30 or 75 per cent) but low NTM are applied (NTEs below 75 per cent). 
Thus, the protection for some products can rely on high tariffs and low NTEs, which means a 
protectionist approach but transparent in the sense that tariffs are less trade-distorting. On the 
other extreme, there are products with relatively low tariffs but the NTMs applied have high 
NTEs, situation that has been considered as "Disguised" protectionism. There are of course 
groups of "High Protection" and "Low Protection", grouping products where both tariffs and 
NTEs are high or low, respectively. 
The taxonomy of protection is illustrated in Table 3, which shows that a significant number of 
products can be considered as receiving transparent or low protection levels.  
Disguised protection is significant in Morocco, Tunisia and Egypt if thresholds are set at 75%, 
ranging from 19 percent of total products in Tunisia to 26 percent in Egypt. When thresholds are 
lowered for tariffs to 30%, the disguised protection group diminishes in Morocco and Tunisia, 
but in turn, the high protection group increases in both countries to 22 percent in Morocco and 
Options Méditerranéennes, A, no. 111, 2015 122 
23 percent in Tunisia. This indicates that, in spite of the criterion for setting the level of tariff 
peaks, the NTE keep a protective role in a significant number of cases. 
 
Table 3. Taxonomy of agricultural trade protection (Percentage of products in each group) Source: 
 Authors’ calculations 















Thresholds: NTE 75% and Tariff 75% 
High 1 22  0 - 2 02  9 02,03  
Disguised 26 08  4 02  21 03  19 03  
Low 71 03  95 03  71 03  48 03  
Transparent 1 22  2 22  5 02  25 07  
Thresholds: NTE 75% and Tariff 30% 
High 6 20  0 - 22 03  23 03  
Disguised 21 08, 15  3 02  2 12  5 12  
Low 57 03  52 03  15 15  14 12  
Transparent 15 20  45 08  61 03  58 03  
Note: HS chapters: 02: Meat and edible meat offal; 03: Fish and crustaceans; 07: Edible Vegetables; 08: Edible 
Fruits and Nuts; 12: Oil seeds and oleaginous; 15: Animal or vegetable fats and oils; 20: Preparations of 
vegetables and fruits; 22: Beverages. 
 
Jordan shows a low protection level, irrespective of the criteria set. It does not have products in 
the high protection group, and the percentage of products in the disguised group is only 4 
percent taking the first criterion (75%, 75%) and 3 percent in the second criterion (75%, 30%). 
In Egypt, the high protection group keeps at only 6 percent of total products with the same 
thresholds but the disguised protection group still represents 21 percent of products for the 
same criterion. As a conclusion, data on tariff and NTE show that: (i) high NTE are still 
significant in several SEMCs countries; and (ii) high NTE appear both in products with relatively 
high and in products with relatively low tariff levels.  
IV – Concluding remarks 
In this paper, the protection applied by SEMCs to agro-food products is analyzed. The general 
argument to be explored was that NTMs are affected by economic and political reasons that are 
not necessarily connected to specific sanitary and safety concerns. This was approached 
following two main specific hypotheses. The first is that EU import border rejections and food 
alerts are explained by a range of variables, including the history of past notifications 
("reputation" effect), the import volumes and growth, and per capita GDP of exporting countries. 
The second hypothesis deals with the possibility of a policy substitution or complementarity 
between tariffs and NTMs. Both hypotheses were investigated in the context of the Euro-
Mediterranean DCFTA.  
EU Notifications included in the RASFF database appeared to have been influenced by real 
SPS and TBT problems. However, beyond specific safety problems, there is a wider common 
behaviour on the way standards are applied. EU notifications are affected firstly by the own 
reputation of a product and the sector reputation in a given zone, with relatively stronger effect 
of the reputation built at a product level. Notifications are also pushed up by the import volume, 
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with a clear response of the alert system to import growth, suggesting possible protectionist 
reactions. Implementation of NTMs by the EU vary according the per capita GDP of the 
exporter, suggesting that investment in infrastructure and human capacities favour the 
integration of agro-exporting firms in the global value chains to comply with EU requirements 
regarding the quality of imported products.   
However, no special disguised protection was found in the way EU policies affect export flows 
from Mediterranean countries to the EU member states, compared to flows originated in other 
world’s regions. 
The policy substitution analysis was carried out by combining information regarding the 
protection via tariffs and via NTMs, using comprehensive datasets, which allow a product-by-
product detailed view of the issue. Means of achieving agricultural protection are varied in the 
Mediterranean region. There are different possibilities at stake: only-tariff protection, in other 
cases NTMs may be used as a substitute for tariffs, while in other cases significant NTMs 
coincide with tariffs. 
To ascertain these elements, a taxonomy or categorization of the products has been made, 
considering simultaneously the protection via tariffs and via NTMs. The dominant category 
observed is low protection. However, the general picture shows that a relatively high level of 
transparent protection (e.g., high tariffs and relatively low NTEs) still remains as well as 
significant disguised protection (e.g. low tariffs and relatively high NTEs) in the four countries 
considered. Nevertheless, there are some country differences, as Jordan and Egypt seem to 
have lower number of products with significant protection. The general conclusion is consistent 
with other estimates (see Rau and Kavallari, 2013). In addition, another remarkable fact is that 
the values of the NTEs are lower than the tariffs. 
The level of protection in the considered sample of SEMCs varies depending on the products, 
although certain product chapters 02 (meat), 03 (fish), 20 and 22 (processed fruit and 
vegetables) are more protected which is in line with some previous results from Tudela et al., 
(2013).  
While this analysis indicates that there could be certain relationship between NMTs and tariffs, it 
cannot be stated that SEMCs are implementing NTMs as a substitute of the (gradually 
declining) protection via tariffs; neither a clear complementarity among both types of protection 
takes place. Consequently, future research could consider a more detailed statistical analysis 
on how the NTE levels depend on tariff levels and on a range of product specificities.  
Our results suggest that the food safety policies in the Mediterranean region do not respond to a 
systematic behaviour or general logic of relationship between NTEs and tariff levels. In any 
case, the analysis requires further exploration at the country level, with focus on identified SPS 
and TBT problems. 
As pointed out in OECD (2011), the challenge for NTMs remains to separate protectionist and 
non-protectionist policies and to identify alternative approaches for trade policies, in particular in 
processes involving DCFTAs. In the case of the SEMCs and their bilateral liberalization, the 
results described above highlight the role of harmonization in NTMs. Indeed, as the NTMs 
applied in the region do not appear to be motivated by tariff liberalization, a case-by-case 
approach could be helpful to foster the harmonization of SPS and TBT standards across the 
countries involved. Such approach could merit from the support of the institutions fostering 
trade liberalization, or from other funds like the ENPARD program.  
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